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In an ultimate, evolutionary sense, the significance of any 
decision rule is measured in lifetime reproductive suc-
cess. Although this implies that animals should attempt 
to maximize the consequences of their actions over the 
long term, overwhelming experimental evidence from 
laboratory studies of temporal discounting indicate that 
animals rarely make far-sighted decisions (Green et al., 
1981; Logue, 1988; Bateson and Kacelnik, 1996; Rachlin, 
2000; Roberts, 2002; Kacelnik, 2003). Rather, they ap-
pear to discount or devalue the future and maximize in-
take in the short term, one decision at a time. Specifi-
cally, animals do not treat all temporal components of the 
decision-making process as equally relevant. Stephens & 
Anderson (2001) emphasized that in experimental sit-
uations, foragers often ignore the time between trials 
(Mazur, 1989; Bateson and Kacelnik, 1996), postfeeding 
delays (Lea, 1979; Logue et al., 1985) and the latency 
from when the choice period begins to when a decision 
is made (Bateson & Kacelnik 1996). The delay-to-food ac-
cess, or the time between making a choice and receiving 
the reward, has the strongest influence over choice be-
haviour: animals subjectively devalue rewards even when 
the delay is no more than a few seconds (Ainslie, 1974; 
Mazur, 1987; Kacelnik, 1997). Taken together, these find-
ings suggest that animals pay more attention to the time 
between a decision and its consequences than to inter-
vals that occur outside of this range.
Another key temporal component that falls inside this 
critical range is handling time, or the period necessary 
for a forager to actually process and consume food (Ste-
phens & Krebs 1986). Studies of optimal foraging the-
ory have demonstrated the importance of handling time 
in prey selection (Lea, 1979; Snyderman, 1983; Shettle-
worth, 1985). For example, in various species, the ease of 
cracking open nuts (i.e. handling time) influences an in-
dividual’s decision to either consume or cache those nuts 
(Woodrey, 1990; Jacobs, 1992; Cristol, 2001).
Handling time is integral to studies of temporal dis-
counting because it occurs after the food is initially ac-
cessed, but before another decision can be executed. 
Many studies of discounting, however, ignore handling 
time. In fact, most psychologists studying animal dis-
counting confound reward amount and handling time by 
using time of access to the food as the reinforcer (Rachlin 
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Abstract
Foraging decisions in nonhuman animals often require choosing between small, immediate food rewards and 
larger, more delayed rewards. Faced with such choices, animals typically discount or devalue the future quite 
strongly. Although discounting studies often focus on delays to reward access, other temporal intervals contrib-
ute to foraging rate, and thus may potentially influence discounting levels. Here, we examine the effect of han-
dling time, the time required to process and consume food, on discounting in cottontop tamarins, Saguinus oe-
dipus, and common marmosets, Callithrix jacchus, two species that differ in levels of temporal discounting. We 
presented subjects with a discounting task under two conditions. In the first condition, we made the entire re-
ward available after the delay expired. In the second condition, we experimentally increased the minimum length 
of time required to consume the reward to simulate a longer handling time. We found that tamarins and marmo-
sets showed sensitivity to increases in the time necessary to process food rewards. Both species adjusted their 
preferences to account for different handling times at long delays to accessing food. Consequently, models of dis-
counting behaviour that include handling times may better describe animal choices than models that focus ex-
clusively on delays prior to access.
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and Green, 1972; Ainslie, 1974; Mazur, 1987, 2000; Tobin 
and Logue, 1994). There are, however, two notable excep-
tions. Bateson & Kacelnik (1996) used food pellet num-
ber as the reward amount and measured European star-
lings’, Sturnus vulgaris, handling time in a foraging task. 
They found that a rate maximization model that included 
both delay to access and handling time best described the 
subjects’ decisions. Further evidence that handling time 
may be important in discounting comes from research 
examining animal preferences between sequences of re-
wards ( Brunner & Gibbon 1995). Brunner & Gibbon al-
lowed rats, Rattus norvegicus, to choose between two de-
layed sequences of rewards in which individual pieces of 
food become available successively. By varying the time 
between rewards, they could assess the role of the tem-
poral spacing of food accrual in the overall discounting 
decision. Subjects preferred a more delayed clumped op-
tion to a less delayed spaced-out reward sequence that 
took longer to eat, implying that they may have avoided 
options with longer handling times.
Here, we examine how lengthening handling time af-
fects discounting preferences in two New World mon-
keys: cottontop tamarins, Saguinus oedipus, and common 
marmosets, Callithrix jacchus. Specifically, we presented 
subjects with a choice between smaller, immediate food 
rewards and larger, delayed rewards under two condi-
tions. In the first condition, the chosen food reward dis-
pensed immediately after the delay expired. In the second 
condition, we increased the minimum amount of time 
necessary to consume both reward options by adding an 
interpellet interval (IPI) between each successive piece of 
food (Fig. 1). If handling time is a component of the dis-
counting calculation in these animals, then they should 
have a stronger preference for immediate rewards un-
der the second condition, because the total amount of 
time necessary to acquire and process rewards is longer.
Previous experiments with these species have char-
acterized both their temporal discounting (Stevens et al. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005a) and spatial discounting (Stevens et al. 2005b) lev-
els. In the temporal discounting task, marmosets waited 
a significantly longer time for the larger reward than did 
tamarins, whereas in the distance discounting task, tama-
rins travelled much further for the large reward than did 
the marmosets. These results are consistent with differ-
ences in their species-typical ecology. Both species feed 
on fruit, insects and tree exudates such as sap and gum 
(Snowdon and Soini, 1988; Stevenson and Rylands, 1988; 
Garber, 1993; Rylands and de Faria, 1993). Cottontop 
tamarins, however, spend 0–5% of their foraging time 
feeding on exudates, whereas common marmosets spend 
20–70% (Stevenson and Rylands, 1988; Power, 1996). 
Therefore, marmosets rely much more heavily on exu-
dates (Coimbra-Filho and Mittermeier, 1976; Stevenson 
and Rylands, 1988; Rylands and de Faria, 1993; Harrison 
and Tardif, 1994), a relatively stable food source that re-
quires considerable investment: individuals must chew at 
the surface of the tree and wait for sap to exude, so mar-
mosets often spend 3–75 s actively gouging holes in the 
trees before they begin feeding (Lacher et al., 1981; Ste-
venson and Rylands, 1988). Owing to this dietary niche, 
exudate-feeding species of marmosets have a number of 
specializations in dental, muscle and gut morphology and 
physiology that tamarin species lack (Coimbra-Filho and 
Mittermeier, 1976; Sussman and Kinzey, 1984; Ferrari 
et al., 1993, Harrison and Tardif, 1994; Power and Oft-
edal, 1996; Dumont, 1997, Vinyard et al., 2003; and Tay-
lor and Vinyard, 2004). Some suggest that selection for 
exudate feeding is strong enough to influence marmoset 
social systems, home range size and even spatial memory 
(Ferrari and Lopes Ferrari, 1989; Ferrari, 1993; Harrison 
and Tardif, 1994; Platt et al., 1996). In contrast, tamarins 
feed more on insects and fruit. When they do feed on ex-
udates, they primarily consume gums and saps that have 
been previously exposed, thereby obtaining an immediate 
reward in the absence of significant investment in extrac-
tion (Neyman, 1977; Garber, 1980, 1992, 1993; Sussman 
and Kinzey, 1984). The marmosets’ specialization on ex-
udate feeding may have also shaped their temporal dis-
counting functions (Stevens et al. 2005a).
What is not yet clear, however, is whether tamarins 
and marmosets demonstrate sensitivity to changes in han-
dling time, or if they can adjust their choice behaviour 
to accommodate such changes. The temporal discounting 
experiment (Stevens et al. 2005a) showed that tamarins, 
but not marmosets, rate-maximized over a time interval 
that included the delay-to-food (tamarins: 5.6–9.8 s, mar-
mosets: 10.0–19.0 s) and handling time (tamarins: 4.8–
46 s, marmosets: 6.2–21.8 s). Notably, this research sug-
gests that tamarins and marmosets may actually make 
decisions over different temporal horizons, with marmo-
sets rate maximizing over a longer interval. We contend 
that differences in optimal time horizons may be espe-
cially relevant when considering handling time, because 
handling time varies in its contribution to total foraging 
time across species. That is, although handling time may 
be a significant temporal component of foraging for some 
animals, for others, handling time may be negligible. For 
instance, the size and type of food item greatly influence 
Figure 1. Experimental conditions. Following a 30-s intertrial in-
terval (ITI), subjects chose between receiving two food pellets im-
mediately (t2 = 0.5 s) or six food pellets after a delay (t6 = 5, 10, or 
15 s). (a) In the normal condition, the entire food reward was avail-
able following the chosen delay, so the subjects could consume or 
“handle” the pellets at their leisure (h2 and h6). (b) In the incre-
mental condition, an additional interpellet interval (IPI) spaced out 
the distribution of the pellets and experimentally lengthened han-
dling times h2’ and h6’.
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handling time. Large items or items with coverings and 
inedible parts require longer handling times than small 
items that lack protective coatings. Consequently, differ-
ences in handling time may be less salient to some spe-
cies than others, simply because it makes a trivial contri-
bution to foraging rate under some conditions. Moreover, 
handling or processing different food resources may im-
pose different opportunity costs. Some food types are du-
rable and transportable, whereas others must be utilized 
on the spot. We hypothesize that these considerations 
may be especially relevant when considering tamarins 
and marmosets because of their specialized feeding ecol-
ogies: insects, fruits and exudates differ in the temporal 
properties associated with processing. Since the insects 
upon which tamarins and marmoset feed are primarily 
mobile insects such as grasshoppers, crickets, cicadas and 
cockroaches (Stevenson & Rylands 1988), they can escape 
quickly once predators are detected. In addition, both 
fruits and insects can be consumed soon after capture. 
Foraging for exudates as marmosets do, however, requires 
gouging holes and waiting for gum or sap to seep out over 
a longer time span. Therefore, when monkeys make a for-
aging choice by gouging holes in trees, they cannot reap 
the rewards until after some delay. Because marmosets 
are specialized exudate feeders, they may tolerate longer 
handling times than tamarins. In contrast, tamarins might 
be more sensitive to variation in search time, given their 
primary consumption of fruits and insects.
Methods
Subjects
Four adult cottontop tamarins (two females and two males) 
and four adult common marmosets (three males and one fe-
male) participated in this experiment. All four marmosets 
had prior experience in a temporal discounting experiment 
(Stevens et al. 2005a), and the tamarins were naïve to the 
discounting task but had experience with a wide diversity of 
experiments on tool use, cooperation, call perception, lan-
guage processing and number representation (Hauser et al., 
2001, Hauser et al., 2003, Uller et al., 2001, Miller et al., 
2002 and Santos et al., 2003). In addition to food received in 
experiments, we fed subjects a nightly meal and maintained 
both species at approximately 90% free-feeding weight. This 
weight range is similar to that observed for both species in 
the wild (Snowdon and Soini, 1988 and Stevenson and Ry-
lands, 1988). Before beginning the experiment, the marmo-
sets weighed 310–365 g, and the tamarins weighed 400–465 g 
(Table 1).
Experimental Design
We presented subjects with a choice between two imme-
diate and six delayed banana-flavoured food pellets (Re-
search Associates, 45 mg of purified primate diet pellets). 
We used these food pellets to both gain direct control over 
the quantity and size of food delivered and to directly con-
trast with prior experiments using the same food rewards. 
Each subject experienced two food distribution conditions 
(normal and incremental) at three delays to the large re-
ward (5 s, 10 s and 15 s). We pseudorandomized the order of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
presentation such that each subject started with a different 
condition/delay combination. In the normal distribution, all 
the food dispensed approximately at once following the cho-
sen delay (constraints on the dispensing machine resulted in 
a short 0.4-s IPI between each successive piece of food be-
ing dispensed). In the incremental condition, an additional 
IPI was added between each individual piece of food being 
dispensed (Fig. 1). We calculated this IPI for each subject to 
manipulate an individual’s overall handling time (Table 1). 
For each condition–delay combination, subjects completed 
three consecutive session replicates.
To determine the IPI for each subject, we first measured 
each individual’s average handling time for consuming the 
larger reward of six pellets (h6) over three training sessions 
in which all the food dispensed at once (as in the normal 
condition). Handling time consisted of the period from when 
food was first available to when the subject placed the last 
piece in his/her mouth. We divided this measurement by 
the total number of pellets (six) to determine the per-pellet 
handling time, and finally doubled it to lengthen each sub-
ject’s individual IPI. That is,
Incremental IPI = 2(h6)
                                                               6
Apparatus and Set-up
We placed subjects in a small transport cage (30 × 30 × 
30 cm) inside a Plexiglas test enclosure (46 cm tall, 35.5 cm 
wide and 40 cm deep; Fig. 2a). The back and side walls of 
the test apparatus were opaque black; the front was white 
and had three openings into which subjects could reach (Fig. 
2b). Transparent Plexiglas doors prevented access to the two 
side openings. When subjects were allowed to make a choice, 
solenoids raised the doors, giving access to the openings, 
which contained small plastic bars mounted by a spring to a 
back wall. Subjects touched these tools to make their choice: 
by reaching through either of the openings to touch the tool 
inside, subjects broke an infrared beam (MED Associates 
ENV-253SD) positioned slightly above the tool. Breaking ei-
ther beam signalled a choice and started the corresponding 
delay. Food dropped into a bin in the centre opening via a 
small tube attached to a pellet dispenser (MED Associates 
ENV-203IR). A small camera (Videolabs FlexCam) mounted 
directly outside the food bin allowed the experimenter to 
Table 1.  Incremental condition interpellet interval (IPI) for each 
subject, based on average handling time for six pellets.
Subject Species Weight (g) Handling time (s) IPI (s)
ANT M 310 9.99 3.3
OTH M 315 15.3 5.1
JUL M 365 11.1 3.7
ROM M 330 15.3 5.1
RB T 440 14.4 4.8
SH T 465 14.1 4.7
JM T 450 11.4 3.8
PJ T 400 23.7 7.9
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observe when the subject finished eating all the food in a 
given trial. A computer running MED-PC control and data 
acquisition software controlled all outputs (stimulus lights, 
pellet dispenser, tone generator and solenoids) and recorded 
inputs (infrared beams, user-input button) via a program 
written in Medstate Notation.
Trial and Session Procedures
Every trial consisted of an initial intertrial interval (ITI) 
of 30 s, a 15-s period during which subjects could make a 
choice, the delay following the subject’s choice, and a han-
dling period during which subjects consumed the food re-
ward. At the beginning of a choice period, a short (0.5 s) 
tone sounded, both doors opened, and lights above the tools 
illuminated to denote each available option. We counterbal-
anced across subjects whether purple or yellow lights were 
associated with receiving two pellets immediately or six pel-
lets after a time delay. For all trials, we randomly assigned 
the side of the enclosure for larger and smaller rewards. 
Subjects then had 15 s to make a response. Once subjects re-
sponded, the light associated with the chosen option flashed, 
a tone sounded, the alternate option’s light extinguished, 
and its door closed. The chosen delay then began, and dur-
ing the delay, the experimenter closed the chosen door (via 
a user-input button) after the subject removed his/her hand.
Once the delay finished, the tone stopped and the white 
light in the centre food bin illuminated. This light flashed 
every time a piece of food dispensed; once all the food was 
dispensed, the light remained illuminated during the han-
dling period. The light associated with the subject’s choice 
also remained illuminated during the handling time. When 
the subject finished eating (marked when the subject placed 
the last piece of food in his/her mouth), the experimenter 
pressed the user response button to extinguish all lights and 
begin the next ITI.
Each daily session consisted of 14 completed trials. For 
each condition/delay combination, subjects first completed a 
forced-choice session in which they received only one option 
per trial (either two pellets immediately or six pellets after 
a delay); this session allowed them to gain familiarity with 
the reward contingencies. To pass the forced-choice session, 
subjects could fail to make a choice within 15 s no more than 
twice in a session. If a subject failed to choose more than 
Figure 2. Experimental apparatus. The transport cages containing the subjects were placed in the operant chamber. (a) Top view of cham-
ber: subjects made a choice by reaching into one of the two side boxes and touching the response tool inside, thereby breaking an infrared 
beam. (b) Subjects’ view of front panel: once the chosen delay ended, food rewards dispensed into the centre food bin.
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two times, then we aborted the session and started afresh 
the next day. After passing the forced-choice session, sub-
jects completed three free-choice sessions at that same con-
dition and delay, in which we allowed them to freely choose 
between the two options. In a free-choice session, the first 
four trials were forced-choice, and the last 10 were free-
choice. Subjects had to successfully complete all forced tri-
als but could fail to make a choice in no more than two non-
consecutive free trials.
Statistical Analysis
We analysed the data using repeated measures analysis 
of variance (ANOVA). For the choice data, we performed 
two ANOVAs. In the first, we used condition and delay pe-
riod as within-subjects factors (a 2 × 3 design) and spe-
cies as a between-subjects factor. In the second, we re-
analysed these data to examine whether subjects’ choices 
changed over the course of a session by using trial number 
as a within-subjects factor (10 trials) and species as a be-
tween-subjects factor. Choice data consisted of the propor-
tion of total picks for the large reward in a free-choice ses-
sion. We arcsine, square-root transformed the proportions 
to normalize the data. Two separate ANOVAs were con-
ducted on the timing data: one for choice latencies (time 
between stimulus onset and choice) and one for per-pel-
let handling time (time between first pellet dispensed and 
last pellet consumed divided by number of pellets). Both 
of these ANOVAs had condition and delay period as within-
subjects factors and species as a between-subjects factor. 
We used the Huynh–Feldt correction when assumptions of 
sphericity or homogeneity of variance were violated (My-
ers & Well 1995). We used Bonferroni test statistics on all 
comparisons of means in the within-subject design, and 
we report the pairwise comparisons with P ≤ 0.05 (Max-
well & Delaney 2004).
Results
IPI Determination
Based on observational measurements of individual-spe-
cific handling times for six pellets (range 9.99–23.7 s), 
each subject was assigned an experimental IPI that dou-
bled their handling time (range 3.3–7.9 s; Table 1).
Handling Time and Choice Data
Subjects required a mean ± SE of 2.3 ± 0.2 s to con-
sume one piece of food in the normal condition and a 
mean ± SE of 4.3 ± 0.5 s to consume one piece in the in-
cremental condition. As factors, neither delay (ANOVA: 
F2, 10 = 2.32, P = 0.15) nor species (ANOVA: F1, 6 = 0.85, 
P = 0.39) influenced handling times: marmosets and tam-
arins took equivalent amounts of time to consume food 
rewards across all three delays.
Subjects (pooled across species) chose the large re-
ward 74 ± 5% of the time at a 5-s delay-to-large, 70 ± 4% 
of the time at a 10-s delay, and 63 ± 5% of the time at a 
15-s delay. These differences were not statistically sig-
nificant (ANOVA: F2, 12 = 1.51, P = 0.26). Subjects chose 
the large reward 71 ± 4% of the time in the normal con-
dition and 67 ± 4% of the time in the incremental condi-
tion, but this difference also was not significant (ANOVA: 
F1, 6 = 1.19, P = 0.32). There was, however, a significant 
interaction between delay and condition (ANOVA: F2, 
12 = 11.57, P < 0.01). At the 15-s delay, subjects chose 
the large reward less on the incremental condition rela-
tive to the normal condition: subjects chose the large re-
ward 71 ± 5% of the time in the normal condition, but 
only 56 ± 6% of the time when in the incremental condi-
tion (Bonferroni post hoc comparison: P = 0.02; Fig. 3). 
Moreover, subjects chose the large reward less in the in-
cremental condition at the 15-s delay than in the incre-
mental condition at a 10-s delay, as well as in the 5-s de-
lay for both conditions (Bonferroni post hoc comparisons: 
P < 0.05). This indicates that subjects in both species de-
valued rewards with increased handling times when the 
delay to the large reward was long (Fig. 4).
The two species also differed with respect to the pro-
portion of trials in which individuals chose the larger re-
ward (ANOVA: F1, 6 = 8.97, P = 0.02). Across all delays 
and conditions, marmosets selected the large reward an 
average of 80 ± 5% of the time, whereas tamarins se-
lected the large reward an average of 59 ± 5% of the 
time (Fig. 5). A second ANOVA on the choice data for each 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean ± SE proportion of trials during which subjects (col-
lapsed across species) chose the larger reward when the entire food 
reward was dispensed at once (normal condition) and when an ad-
ditional interpellet interval was added before each additional food 
pellet was dispensed (incremental condition) following a delay-to-
reward of 5, 10 or 15 s. *P < 0.05.
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subject’s performance across a session indicated that there 
was no effect of trial (ANOVA: F9, 54 = 0.60, P = 0.79) on 
discounting preferences. Subjects of both species chose 
consistently throughout an experimental session, suggest-
ing that the species difference in discounting level did not 
result from different levels of satiation.
Discussion
Handling Time and Rate Maximization
When faced with a decision between receiving two pieces 
of food immediately and six pieces of food after 15 s, han-
dling time affected discounting preferences in tamarins 
and marmosets. This implies that both species showed 
sensitivity to differences in handling time and adjusted 
their preferences to account for these differences. As 
predicted by a rate maximization model in which ani-
mals maximize over the entire delay and handling time 
interval (Bateson & Kacelnik, 1996), a longer handling 
time caused marmosets and tamarins to be less likely to 
choose the larger reward.
Although many aspects of long-term rate do not affect 
animal choices, tamarins and marmosets adjust their be-
haviour to account for the handling times associated with 
food rewards. Why do animals include handling time 
within their time horizon but ignore other temporal in-
tervals in a discounting task (such as ITI and postfeeding 
delays)? One possibility is that animals have evolved to 
attend only to those intervals that occur between a deci-
sion and its outcome (see Bateson & Kacelnik, 1996). An-
imals have control over the time they spend processing 
food because different options are associated with dif-
ferent handling times. In contrast, intervals that do not 
occur between a decision and its outcome are not under 
the direct control of a forager: animals have no choice 
but to wait their entire duration. Animals may therefore 
pay more attention to those temporal intervals that they 
can directly affect with their behaviour but ignore those 
that are obligatory and out of their control, even if they 
influence the optimal long-term intake rate. Gallistel & 
Gibbon (2000, page 322) make the analogy between ig-
noring certain time intervals and the “sunk cost” effect 
described by economists, which is ‘a cost that appears to 
be relevant to the computation of the utility of an alter-
native but in fact is not and ought to be ignored in ratio-
nal (normative) economic decision making’.
Handling time did not significantly affect discounting 
choices across all delays, however, suggesting that the in-
creases in handling time are more relevant to tamarins 
and marmosets when the delay to accessing food rewards 
is already long. This contradicts the predictions of rate 
maximization, because handling time should affect dis-
counting levels more when it comprises a greater propor-
tion of the total time interval. Since handling times are 
a larger proportion of total time at short delays-to-food 
access, according to rate maximization, handling time 
should influence decisions more at the 5-s delay-to-large 
than the 15-s delay-to-large. One possible explanation 
for our finding is that, despite increased handling times, 
subjects were still below their indifference points at the 
shorter delays. That is, even including the additional han-
dling time does not push the subject to the point at which 
it should switch preferences. Alternatively, delays to food 
and handling times may not be weighted linearly in dis-
counting decisions; for example, handling times may be 
more heavily weighted depending on the length of the 
initial delay to accessing the food. Therefore, if we had 
included longer delays-to-large, we might have seen a 
larger effect of handling time at those delays. One way 
to address these possibilities is to perform a discounting 
titration that simultaneously manipulates both delay-to-
access and handling time. Such an experiment could as-
sess the differential contributions of delays and handling 
time to the monkeys’ discounting preferences.
Figure 4. Mean ± SE proportion of trials during which marmosets 
and tamarins chose the larger reward in each condition (normal, 
incremental) following a 15-s delay-to-reward. *P < 0.05.
Figure 5. Mean ± SE proportion of trials during which individuals 
of both species chose the larger reward (collapsed across all delays 
and conditions). *P < 0.05.
Handling time and temporal discounting in two primates  1385
The Temporal Properties of Food and  
Ecological Factors
The results of this experiment also replicate the earlier 
findings by Stevens et al. (2005a) that tamarins devalue 
rewards more heavily than marmosets in temporal dis-
counting tasks. Although that experiment used a titration 
adjustment procedure to determine subjects’ indifference 
points between the large and small rewards, and this ex-
periment examined subject’s preferences across three dif-
ferent delays to the large reward, tamarins discounted 
more steeply than marmosets in both paradigms. Addition-
ally, in the previous study, subjects had full visual access 
to both potential food rewards, whereas in this study, nei-
ther reward was visible until after the chosen time delay.
As previously mentioned, differences in ecology and 
diet composition may explain the observed difference in 
discounting level between these two species. The varia-
tion in the temporal distribution of their primary food 
sources further suggests that tamarins and marmosets 
may be differentially sensitive to changes in handling 
time: marmosets may tolerate relatively long handling 
times, whereas tamarins might be more sensitive to vari-
ation in search time. This experiment, however, indicates 
that both species respond similarly to increases in han-
dling times, suggesting a more general role of handling 
time in foraging strategies. Nevertheless, tamarins’ and 
marmosets’ respective dietary specializations raise the 
possibility that more natural ways of altering handling 
times may trigger different responses. The handling time 
manipulation presented here was very general and in-
volved altering the handling time of a food item that the 
monkeys do not naturally consume. Additionally, because 
banana pellets are neither natural nor available in their 
daily diets, subjects had to learn and remember the han-
dling times required in different conditions. Moreover, 
they had reduced control over the times they spent pro-
cessing the food. This raises the possibility that when 
feeding on actual gum, fruit or insects, such known phys-
ical entities might cue different discounting levels.
Although the experiment presented here did not ex-
plicitly address the mechanistic basis of discounting de-
cisions, one possible explanation for the differences in 
tamarin and marmoset discounting levels is that the 
two species differ in either their ability to time intervals 
or in the strength of their timing preferences (for a re-
views of cross-species timing experiments, see Gibbon 
et al., 1984 and Richelle and Lejeune, 1984). Few stud-
ies have explicitly studied timing abilities in primates, 
and none have compared across two or more species us-
ing the same method. One possibility, then, is that tam-
arins and marmosets differ in their abilities to discrim-
inate temporal intervals. Their similar responses to the 
incremental condition suggest a lack of large perceptual 
differences, especially since both species reduced their 
discounting levels in response to small additional IPIs. 
However, the two species may differ in their temporal 
preferences for delays to food: marmosets may actually 
lack strong time preferences relative to the tamarins. For 
a marmoset, waiting the shorter delay and waiting the 
longer delay may be (subjectively) about the same. If they 
do indeed lack strong time preferences, then the length 
of delay would influence marmosets less than tamarins 
when making a discounting decision.
What Is Handling Time and When Is It Relevant?
A possible criticism of our manipulation is its artificial-
ity. We construe the incremental condition as a manip-
ulation of handling time, but the subjects may not have 
perceived it in this way. Rather than treating the incre-
mentally dispensed food as one reward distributed over 
a longer interval, they may have interpreted it as many 
separate, discrete rewards (although Brunner & Gibbon 
(1995) suggest this is not the case for pigeons). Our ex-
perimental design attempted to minimize this possibility 
by making the additional IPI a function of each individ-
ual’s handling time. However, in the incremental condi-
tion, subjects also did not have visual access to the en-
tire reward throughout the entire handling time period. 
Since visual attention influences impulsivity in human 
children (Mischel & Ebbesen 1970), it may influence de-
lay mechanisms in other animals as well.
The potential artificiality of this experiment leads to 
the further question of how we conceptualize handling 
time. Handling time is generally treated as a uniform 
process, but clearly many different activities can com-
pose total handling time (Lea, 1979; Snyderman, 1983). 
In this experiment alone, handling time included retriev-
ing the food, eating it, and additional periods of rest dur-
ing which food was available but the animal had not fin-
ished consuming it. Do animals perceive all of these 
components in the same way, or do they weight them 
differently in discounting contexts? Do animals perceive 
our task of waiting between pellets as an increase in han-
dling time? One way to examine whether the composition 
of handling time matters is to look at discounting across 
food types that require different sorts of processing. The 
subjects could easily consume the food rewards utilized 
in this experiment, but other types of food require more 
elaborate processing, such as removing seeds from fruit 
and extracting edible parts of prey items. Manipulating 
handling time via a more realistic foraging task involv-
ing the presentation of fruit or insects will enrich our un-
derstanding of how handling time affects discounting in 
a broader range of foraging contexts.
Similarly, rate maximization models assume that de-
lays-to-food access and time spent handling food are in-
terchangeable: both contribute to the total rate of intake, 
so increases in one are equivalent to increases in the 
other. There is evidence, however, that animals may not 
treat these periods as equivalent. Shettleworth & Jordan 
(1986) found that rats prefer handling sunflower seeds 
(that is, spend time removing their husk) over waiting 
to receive unhusked seeds. The authors point out a po-
tential mechanistic explanation for this result: a husked 
seed may act as a stronger reinforcer than a delay signal. 
Since waiting is a passive behaviour, whereas process-
ing is more active, having our subjects simply wait while 
individual food rewards became available may not be an 
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ideal manipulation of handling time. The level of atten-
tion focused on the food item could affect time percep-
tion (Brown 1985), thereby influencing rate calculation. 
To test fully whether waiting and processing are equiva-
lent, one must combine the Shettleworth & Jordan design 
with our own, having subjects either wait for each re-
ward item or process an equivalent amount for an equiv-
alent time period in a discounting paradigm.
Finally, in natural foraging settings, the delay and han-
dling times may involve different activities and be asso-
ciated with different risks. For example, a food reward 
that is being processed is more certain than one that has 
not yet been obtained. But long handling times may also 
be risky for a different reason: competitors can steal the 
food item, which is a risk that obviously does not exist 
before food has been obtained. As such, long handling 
times may be more relevant to some foragers than long 
search times.
Conclusions
Both tamarins and marmosets adjusted their choices to 
account for handling time at long delays to accessing food 
rewards. They responded similarly to increases in han-
dling time, despite overall differences in discounting lev-
els: tamarins devalued future rewards more steeply than 
marmosets, replicating earlier results on temporal dis-
counting in these species (Stevens et al. 2005a). Com-
bined with work by Bateson & Kacelnik (1996), our work 
implies that models of discounting behaviour that include 
handling times may better account for the choices that an-
imals make than models that only include delays to food. 
Further experiments are necessary to determine how an-
imals weight handling time relative to delays to food, as 
well as whether different types of food-processing activ-
ities have equal influence on discounting decisions.
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